smabeeshecfy的部落格

現在買東西真的是太方便了，而且每個商城都有很多優惠

因為物流的進步以及無遠弗屆網路商城，在這個特殊時期，不出門也是顧慮到自身安全

無論是生活上用的，還是比較高單價的3c產品，目前在網路上選購比較多，真的是非常方便啊

科技始終來自於惰性真的沒錯，這就是懶人經濟啊!!!!(好像哪裡怪怪的)

【德泰】頂級飯店獨立筒 彈簧床墊-雙人5尺是我在網路上閒逛時，猛然看到的產品，而且這產品其實我在很多評論網站觀察很久了

以實用性，價格，網路開箱文，臉書還有Dcard的相關資料來判定，推薦的人真的不少

而且當時的入手價跟現在比，現在入手才真正賺到，實際到貨後，也是非常的符合我的需求~~~

最近家人也是很需要這個【德泰】頂級飯店獨立筒 彈簧床墊-雙人5尺，不枉費做了好幾天功課，好險沒出槌

現在終於等到最佳購買時機，不然等下次折扣，不知道等到甚麼時候

所以我個人對【德泰】頂級飯店獨立筒 彈簧床墊-雙人5尺的評比如下

外觀質感：★★★★

使用爽度：★★★★☆

性能價格：★★★★☆

詳細介紹如下~參考一下吧

完整產品說明

 

 

品牌名稱

尺寸

• 雙人

軟硬度

• 稍軟

功能

• 防蹣

保固期

• 10年保固期

• 依原廠規定保固

商品規格

• 品名：德泰 頂級飯店獨立筒 彈簧床墊 雙人5尺
  尺寸：寬152 cm X 長188 cm X 高24-25 cm
  彈簧：獨立筒彈簧 彈簧數1015個(雙人） 1.75mm線徑
  軟硬度：適中
  產地：台灣製造
  材質：
  德泰高品質高含碳量獨立筒彈簧(手工彈簧)
  飯店專用高級防火防蹣緹花織布
  透氣孔設計
  內夾層多層棉墊

非常推薦【德泰】頂級飯店獨立筒 彈簧床墊-雙人5尺給大家

↓↓↓限量特惠的優惠按鈕↓↓↓

↓↓↓找不到適合的商品嗎，本月好物推薦一起來看吧↓↓↓

標籤註解：

PTT鄉民【德泰】頂級飯店獨立筒 彈簧床墊-雙人5尺限量,團購,限時,週年慶,禮物,優惠,【德泰】頂級飯店獨立筒 彈簧床墊-雙人5尺特價,開箱,比價,活動,好評,推薦

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熱點新知搶先報

作者：編譯 | 承承 李健 摘要：疫情好轉的消息是有助於經濟復甦的，但這種改善主要還是美聯儲/財政部的一攬子救助和刺激計劃取得了結果。 解決社會孤立與經濟復甦之間的矛盾，將是一項非常具有挑戰性的任務。 這一次，槓桿證券化在金融體系中的普及程度有所下降，而且它們的風險資本不是由銀行提供的(這要歸功於「沃爾克規則」) ，而主要是由非銀行貸款機構和基金提供的。 我們還需要有資金幫助對抗病毒的傳播，越早控制病毒，就能拯救更多的生命，美國就能越早恢復活力。 預計資產價格將會下降，你需要做好應對和利用股市下跌的準備。 ... 在過去的六周里，市場經歷了最好的時期和最壞的時期: 2月19日到3月23日，美國股市經歷了歷史上最快的崩盤，標準普爾500指數下跌了33%。而在上周二至周四（3月24日~26日）又快速反彈了17.5%，創下上世紀30年代以來的最佳三日表現。 在2月27日至3月27日的22個交易日中，標準普爾500指數共有18個交易日的波動幅度超過了2%，11個交易日下跌，7個交易日上漲。其中，不僅包括了自1933年以來最大的單日漲幅，還包括了1940年以來的第二大單日跌幅(僅次於1987年的黑色星期一)。 在3月9日至3月20日，發行新的投資級債券似乎是不可想像的。但正如我們的交易員Justin Quaglia指出的，政府的一攬子救助計劃讓49家公司上周發行了1070億美元的IG債券，這不僅是有史以來發行量最大的一周，也是有史以來發行量最大的一個月(106家公司發行了2130億美元) 、最大的一個季度(4730億美元，比2019年第一季度增長了40%)。事實上，上周的債券發行量已經超過了2019年12個月中的9個月。 3月26日，Justin Quaglia表示，「很難相信我在兩周內使用了『恐慌』和『社交控』這兩個詞。」 眾所周知，冠狀病毒仍然在美國和其他地方流行，經濟註定要陷入嚴重的衰退。負債經營的企業擔心貸款來源和流動性問題，而石油價格也是1973年歐佩克禁運以來的最低。金融資產價格也在下降: 適度地下降，過多還是過少?換句話說，我們必須在前所未有的不確定性和完全缺乏有類比的情況下，考慮資產價格的合理性。 毫無疑問，政府和美聯儲注入大量現金改善短期狀況的能力是毋庸置疑的，而且市場肯定將他們視為穩操勝券的贏家。但我認為花點時間認真討論一下可能發生的情況是很重要的。過去一周的補救措施真的有效嗎?前一周的印跡真的被抹掉了嗎?誰會在短期和中期勝出：疾病、經濟影響還是美聯儲/財政部的行動?為了更準確地分析這些問題，我決定從樂觀和悲觀兩方面去考慮。 樂觀的情況 沒有人會認為現在的情況是好的，但樂觀主義者的觀點是圍繞著壞消息的提前停止和在不遠的將來好消息的到來。(你們知道，我通常避免使用宏觀預測，從不自己做預測。我會借用別人的預測結果，來作為這份報告的引用數據，但這不代表我相信他們是準確的)： 最早有些感染「新冠」病毒的國家已經取得了很好的進展。比如韓國，新發病例的報告數據已經趨於平緩，出院的人數比入院的人數還要多。我們法蘭克福辦事處的負責人赫爾曼•達姆巴赫(Hermann Dambach)也報告稱，義大利、德國和奧地利的情況也在改善。 我看到的每個報告都在假設，病毒會在三個月左右得到控制。曲線先是變平，然後向下發展。病毒被控制，然後被消滅。 這種疾病對經濟的負面影響是尖銳而短暫的。「V型」一詞被大多數人採用，影響到第二季度以及二季度至2021年時間段。比如，一位判斷標準普爾500指數成份股公司第二季度收益將下降120%的人士就認為，第三季度的收益可能較上一季度增長80%以上(即從2019年起僅下降20%)，然後在第四季度進一步增長50%。在2020年下降33%之後，2021年的收入將增加55%，並超過2019年的水平。 要求人們呆在家裡，進而導致企業倒閉，如此做法在經濟上相當於為了治療一種嚴重的疾病而讓病人陷入昏迷。在昏迷期間，政府將為經濟提供生命支持，並在治癒後將病人從昏迷中解救出來。 疫情好轉的消息是有助於經濟復甦的，但這種改善主要還是美聯儲/財政部的一攬子救助和刺激計劃取得了結果。他們已經宣布了前所未有的開支，並表示會不惜一切代價，這種行動在本輪危機爆發後的最初幾周就已經展開了。進一步的措施可能包括人們所能想到的一切，數量上也不受限制。 與全球金融危機期間相比，當前銀行的脆弱性大大降低，槓桿率僅為此前的三分之一。因此，對整個金融體系健康狀況的擔憂大大降低。 與此同時，美國的私營部門也為政府的公共衛生努力提供支持，生產大量抗疫物資和設備，開發測試、治療和疫苗。 證券價格的下跌將吸引買家，而充足的資本將以「乾粉」形式存在於基金中。 當我讀到對當前事件更積極的看法時，我不禁回想起我最喜歡的報紙標題，其中包括」銀行家樂觀」這個短語，通常情況下，也許是這樣，但值得注意的是，該報導發表於1929年10月30日，報導了前一天的股市崩盤。在那個樂觀的日子裡，大蕭條還要持續11年。 悲觀的情況 我總是說我們必須意識到，並且公開我們的偏見。我承認，我更多的是擔心，而不是夢想，也許正是這讓我成為了一個比股票分析師更好的信用分析師。可能是我防禦心太強了(儘管在我的職業生涯中，當危機達到低谷時，我能夠以某種方式轉向積極的行動)，今天我列出的缺點比優點多是並不奇怪的(我將更詳細地闡述它們)。 我非常擔心這種疾病的前景，尤其是在美國在很長一段時間裡回應都是建議或忠告，而不是命令或規則。上個周末，我特別擔心大學生春假期間，在海灘上的照片，他們會從那裡回到他們的社區。其他國家在減緩這種疾病方面取得的成功，是通過廣泛的社會疏遠、檢測和測溫來確定感染者，並將他們與其他人隔離開。美國在這方面工作落後了，很少有檢測，也沒有大規模的溫度測量，因為人們懷疑大規模的隔離是否合法。 美國的病例總數已經超過中國和義大利，而且仍在快速增長中(由於測試不足，可能被低估了)。從周四到周六，死亡人數翻了一番，從1000人增加到2000人。 FDA前局長Scott Gottlieb醫學博士最近在推特上說:「我對紐奧良、達拉斯、亞特蘭大、邁阿密、底特律、芝加哥、費城等地的新情況感到擔憂。在中國，除了湖北，沒有一個省的病例超過1500例。而美國已有11個州達到了這個總數。我們的疫情可能是全國性的。」 美國在醫院、病床、呼吸器和物資方面缺乏應對措施。缺乏保護的醫生、護士和急救人員處於危險之中。我擔心，如果我們不效仿成功國家的舉措，病例和死亡人數就會繼續上升，衛生系統將不堪重負。 經濟也將以創紀錄的速度收縮，數以百萬計的人將失去工作，人們將無法光顧企業。不僅工人會失去工資，企業會失去收入，企業的實際產出也會下降，進而意味著食品等必需品可能會短缺。上周，申請失業金人數為330萬人，高於前一周的28.2萬人。 在政府行動之前，預期還包括以下內容:失業率將恢復到8%~10%，公民很快就會缺錢花;企業將關閉;第二季度GDP將比去年同期下降15%~30%(相比歷史上最糟糕的1958年第一季度下降10%)。 一些預測人士說，標普500指數成份股公司第二季度的總收益將下降10%，但這似乎是一個小得可笑的降幅。我看到了一個預測，標準普爾的收益將下降120%(這是正確的。總的來說，500家公司將從盈利轉為虧損)。 政府支付加上增加的失業保險將取代許多工人的工資，對企業的援助將彌補他們失去的部分收入。但是，要多久才能把這些資金送到接受者手中呢?有多少本應成為受助人的人會被遺漏?救助會持續多久?(四口之家的3400美元維持不了多久。)在經濟陷入冰點後，怎樣才能使它恢復生機?它將以多快的速度恢復?換句話說，V型復甦是一種現實的預期嗎? 解決社會孤立與經濟復甦之間的矛盾，將是一項非常具有挑戰性的任務。我們怎樣才能知道這種病是否值得治療?人們呆在家裡的時間越長，經濟恢復就越困難。但是，他們越早返回工作崗位和從事其他活動，就會越難控制這種疾病。 首先，每天新增病例的數量必須要減少。其次，新發病例的數量必須要逐日下降(即增長率必須變為負數)。然後每天不能再有新病例出現。(當然，我們需要加強檢測和強制隔離。)只要每天都有新病例，就說明存在傳染病的人。如果他們與其他人接觸，這種疾病就會繼續存在並傳播。如果我們抓住新病例數量下降的機會去恢復經濟活動，我們又可能會面臨感染率反彈的風險。 大多數情況下，收入下降的公司可以減少開支的，但由於許多開支是固定的(如租金)，他們不能像收入下降那樣迅速減少開支，這也是為什麼第二季度的利潤會縮水、枯竭或轉為負數的原因。對於一些行業(如娛樂業)來說，收入可能會很快恢復，但另一些行業(如郵輪公司)的收入恢復則會相對較慢。 許多公司在進入這一階段時都負債纍纍。管理層利用低利率和慷慨的資本市場發行債券，一些公司通過股票回購，減少股票數量，提高了每股收益(也許還有高管薪酬)。這兩種做法的結果都是提高了債務與股本的比率。一家公司的債務與股本之比越大，其股本回報率在經濟繁榮時期就會越高……但在經濟不景氣時，股本回報率就會越低(或損失越大)，從而度過困難期生存下來的可能性就越小。企業槓桿使收入和利潤損失的問題變得複雜化。因此，我們預計未來幾個月違約率將會上升。 同樣，近年來，寬鬆的資本市場環境，以及在低利率世界尋求回報，促使槓桿投資實體的形成。與槓桿化公司一樣，債務增加了它們的預期回報率，但也增加了它們的脆弱性。因此，我認為，我們很可能會看到槓桿實體違約，其依據是降價、評級下調，或許還包括其投資組合資產的違約; 貸款方增加「折扣」(即減少對1美元抵押品的貸款額) ; 以及追加保證金、資產組合清算和強制拋售。 在全球金融危機中，像抵押貸款債券和債務抵押債券這樣的槓桿投資工具出現崩潰，會給持有次級債務和股權的銀行帶來了損失。銀行系統的重要性使得政府有必要對其進行紓困(這種不滿在很大程度上導致了今天的民粹主義)。這一次，槓桿證券化在金融體系中的普及程度有所下降，而且它們的風險資本不是由銀行提供的(這要歸功於「沃爾克規則」) ，而主要是由非銀行貸款機構和基金提供的。所以，我覺得政府不太可能為他們提供緊急援助。(順便說一句，並不是構建這些槓桿實體的人犯了錯，他們只是沒有在他們模擬的場景中加入一個像現在這樣的情節。他們怎麼可能？如果每個商業決策都必須考慮到疫情的蔓延，那麼幾乎沒有交易會發生了。) 最後，除了疾病及其對經濟的影響，還有一個更重要的因素: 石油。由於消費減少和沙烏地阿拉伯與俄羅斯之間的價格戰，油價已從年底的每桶61美元跌至如今的19美元。石油價格相比1973年石油輸出國組織禁運之前還要低一點。儘管許多消費者、企業和國家受益於油價下跌，但也有國家會因此受到嚴重負面影響： 石油生產企業和國家損失慘重。 失業：石油和天然氣行業直接提供了美國5%以上的工作(更間接地)，自全球金融危機以來，它對失業率的下降做出了巨大貢獻。 該行業的資本投資大幅下降，最近在美國的資本投資中占了相當大的比例的總數。 產量減少，因為消費下降，原油/產品的儲存能力正在耗盡。 當產量減少或停止生產時對儲油層造成的損害。 美國石油獨立性的削弱。 如上所述，負面案例包括，感染和死亡人數的不斷上升、醫療體系承受的難以承受的壓力、數百萬人的失業、廣泛的商業損失和不斷增加的違約。如果出現這些情況，投資者可能會從上周的樂觀情緒轉向普遍存在的悲觀情緒。影響因素包括:對經濟和生活本身構成威脅的消極心理，對更多的恐懼，以及抑制消費和投資的非常消極的財富效應。 政府救助的影響 上周，政府頒布了《CARES(冠狀病毒援助、救濟和經濟安全)法案》，獲得了大約2萬億美元的救助和支持。與此同時，美聯儲還將再花費數萬億美元來提供流動性和支撐金融體系，並「承諾使用其所有工具」。我不會列舉《國際護理法案》的所有條款，只是注意到長達八頁的JP摩根的描述。正如上面所提到的，種類和規模可能還會增加。 我將分享對經濟形勢的有用描述，以及布林資本(Brean Capital)的經濟學家康拉德•德夸德羅斯(Conrad DeQuadros)對政府的回應：《國際關懷法案》不應被視為財政刺激方案，而應被視為穩定經濟的一攬子計劃。2020年3月經濟活動的崩潰不是一個正常的周期性衰退，而是政府強制個人和企業「暫停」的結果。該法案的許多條款旨在防止私營部門解體，以便在疫情控制解除後，活動能夠恢復…… 因航空公司、旅館、餐館、電影院等的收入都在減少，經濟衰退在所難免。就在一個月前，熟練勞動力還是一種稀缺資源。因此，關鍵是要保持勞動力和企業之間的聯繫。對企業的支持實際上是對勞動力的支持，因為如果企業無法從現金流中支付工人薪酬，裁員數字將使最新的申請失業救濟數據變得不好看。 這些措施會有多大效果？ 在最近一個季度，勞動報酬為2.9萬億美元(實際的，非年化的) ，並且，考慮一個純粹的說明性數字，勞動收入下降20% (實際的)達到5770億美元，這大約是家庭直接收入支持的規模，而不考慮對企業的支持，這將防止勞動收入的急劇下降。財政刺激方案將從美聯儲獲得超過4萬億美元的資金支持。此外，我們還需要有資金幫助對抗病毒的傳播，越早控制病毒，就能拯救更多的生命，美國就能越早恢復活力。我們猜測，經過幾個月的封閉生活，將會有大量需求被壓抑。2020年的財政赤字可能達到2.5萬億美元，但如果一攬子計劃失敗，經濟衰退將持續更久、更嚴重，財政成本將更高。 和往常一樣，我不知道哪些經濟學家觀點是對的，但我很樂意接受康拉德的總結。 從理解到目前為止的行動，我想談談這一努力的前景。正如康拉德所說，政府似乎有能力支持和穩定經濟。以我簡單的觀點來看，我想它可以印出足夠的支票，來彌補每個美國工人的工資損失和每個企業的收入損失。換句話說，它可以「模擬」經濟對收入的影響。但我有兩個疑問：這樣可以嗎？這樣夠了嗎？ 首先，正如我上面提到的，我們實際上需要工人和企業的產出。如果所有的企業都倒閉了，我們將得不到我們需要的東西。例如，現在人們都依賴於食品雜貨店送貨和外賣。但是有沒有人想知道食物從何而來，又是如何到達我們身邊的呢?國庫可以彌補人們失去的工資，但人們需要工資購買的東西。因此，僅僅彌補損失的工資和收入是不夠的，經濟必須生產商品和提供服務。 其次，我們假設政府用開支票來永遠取代工資和收入，而經濟繼續以最低但足夠的水平生產，所以我們需要的東西實現了。那麼，長期的影響是什麼？與石油儲備一樣，長期不活躍對經濟生產能力有怎樣的影響? 恢復經濟並使其恢復到以前的運行水平需要多長時間？ 最後，財政部繼續每季度增加數萬億美元的赤字(甚至在病毒襲擊之前就已經達到了1萬億美元)和美聯儲繼續向貨幣體系注入數萬億美元的影響是什麼？去年六月，我討論了現代貨幣理論，這次又有所不同，簡單地說，聯邦赤字和債務無關緊要。它不再只是一個理論，我們現在必須處理它的含義: 上述情況會對美元價值，以及美元作為世界儲備貨幣的地位產生怎樣的影響？(當然，在這種環境下，其它國家的表現可能與我們大致相同，這意味著美元相對於其它貨幣可能不會貶值。) 美元儲備貨幣地位的降低，是否會使我們更難為赤字融資，並提高我們必須為此支付的利率? 大規模印鈔舉措是否會導致通貨膨脹？ 全球原材料和產成品產量下降引發的供應衝擊，是否會加劇通脹？ 造成通貨膨脹的因素確實很神秘，但這些因素看起來都是合理的，尤其是當它們結合在一起的時候。 現代貨幣理論可能沒有經過嚴格的審查和有意識的決定就採用了它。不管我們喜不喜歡，我們都會比想像中更快地看到它的影響。(請記住，芝加哥大學布斯商學院(University of Chicago Booth School of Business)調查的「頂級學者」中，100%的人不同意MMT的一些說法)。 總結 為了向你展示其他人是如何看待這種情況的(儘管方式與我的觀點相似) ，我重複一下memorial sloan kettering的首席信息官傑森·克萊恩(jason klein)的觀點: 看漲的理由似乎是，貨幣政策將發揮作用，財政政策將發揮作用，估值將重新調整，社會將遵循有效的醫療政策(例如，社會疏遠) ，這些政策將是有效的，實體經濟將適應，地緣政治將保持低調。縱觀最近發生的所有事件，我發現在某些方面最有趣的是，沙烏地阿拉伯選擇在美國能源需求已經因為 covid-19限制措施而受到衝擊的時候，挑起了一場針對美國頁巖油的供應衝擊。它強調了事件的不可預測性。 我的橡樹資本聯合創始人兼常駐股東理察•馬森(Richard Masson)可能會說，推特不是一個有價值的信息來源，但不管怎樣，我還是想在推特上加上@yourMTLbroker發布的一份簡明總結: 對牛市預測:6周後一切都將重新開啟。失業者可以回到以前的工作崗位，或者成為真正的美國人。經濟在6個月內恢復正常。低油價和0%的利率將給經濟注入活力。 對熊市預測:失業率升至20%以上。至少在一兩年之內，一切都不會恢復正常，與此同時，需求受到了巨大衝擊。封鎖對企業的影響以及石油危機，造成類似於蕭條的情況。 在全球金融危機中，我還擔心有一連串不利於金融市場的新聞，以及金融機構連續破產對經濟的影響，但是日常生活並沒有改變，也沒有對生命和肢體造成明顯的威脅。 如今，正如上面所述，負面影響的範圍似乎要大得多。社會隔離、疾病和死亡、經濟萎縮、對政府行動的巨大依賴，以及長期影響的不確定性，這些都與我們息息相關，但最重要的問題是，它們還能延續多久？ 目前來看，資產市場價格已經對事件和前景做出了反應(在一個非常微觀的意義上，我覺得上周的反彈反映了太多的樂觀)。雖然樂觀者認為，周五的資產定價是合理的，但沒有為可能出現的惡化情況留出足夠的空間。因此，我對上述情況的反應是，預計資產價格將會下降。你可能認為，在潛在的負面事態發展之前，還有時間來增加防禦性。但重要的是，你需要做好應對和利用股市下跌的準備。 世界總有一天會恢復正常，儘管今天看起來不太可能一成不變。從健康和財政兩方面來說，最重要的還是我們在此期間的態度。安全第一！ 2020年3月31日 （註：本文經過有道初級翻譯後精編） 以下為原文： Latest memo from Howard Marks: Which Way Now? In the last six weeks the markets have seen the best of times and the worst of times: From February 19 to March 23, the U.S. stock market saw the quickest meltdown in history, for a loss of 33.9% on the S&P 500. Then its 17.5% gain from Tuesday through Thursday of last week made for the best three-day stretch since the 1930s. Of the 21 trading days between February 27 and March 27, a total of 18 days saw moves in the S&P 500 of more than 2%: eleven down and seven up. They included the biggest daily percentage gain since 1933 and the second-biggest percentage loss since 1940 (exceeded only by Black Monday in 1987). From March 9 through March 20, issuing a new investment grade bond seemed inconceivable. Then, as our trader Justin Quaglia points out, last week’s news of the government’s rescue package enabled 49 companies to issue $107 billion of IG bonds.That made it the biggest week for issuance on record; part of the biggest month on record ($213 billion from 106 issuers); and part of the biggest quarter on record ($473 billion, up 40% from the first quarter of 2019). In fact, there was more issuance last week than in nine of the 12 months in 2019. Finally, on March 26, Justin wrote, 「It’s hard to believe I used the words 『panic』 and 『FOMO』 within two weeks of each other.」 Looking at the above, it’s important to note the degree to which people (and thus markets) seem to think long-term phenomena can change in the short run. It’s common knowledge that the coronavirus is still gaining ground in the U.S. and elsewhere; the economy is destined for a serious recession; leveraged entities have to worry about their sources of loans and liquidity; and the price of oil is among the very lowest since the 1973 OPEC embargo. But the prices of financial assets have moved down as well: appropriately, too much or too little? In other words, we have to consider the outlook and the appropriateness of value, in the context of unprecedented uncertainty and the total absence of guidance from analogies to the past. There’s no doubt about the ability of the government’s and the Fed’s massive cash injections to make things better in the short run, and certainly the market has treated them as sure winners. But I think it’s important to take time out for a serious discussion of possible scenarios. Are this past week’s remedies certain to work? Are the prior week’s negatives really erased? Which will win in the short and intermediate term: the disease, economic ramifications or Fed/Treasury actions? To try to think about these things in a responsible way, I』ve decided to try cataloging the optimistic and pessimistic elements. The Positive Case No one thinks things are good right now, but the optimist’s view is built around the early cessation of bad news and the arrival of better news in the not-too-distant future. Here are the components. (As you know, I usually avoid using macro forecasts and never make my own. I will borrow from others for the purposes of exposition in this memo, but not because I have reason to believe they』re correct): The earliest countries to contract the virus have shown good progress. The reported data on their new cases has flattened, and in South Korea, more people are being released from the hospitals than are entering. Hermann Dambach, head of our Frankfurt office, reports that the numbers are improving in Italy, Germany and Austria. Every forecast I』ve seen assumes the virus will be brought under control within three months or so. The curve is flattened and then turned downward. The virus is contained and then eliminated. Testing identifies those infected, and isolation/quarantine keeps them from infecting others.Herd immunity develops, reducing the number of people capable of transmitting the disease.Warmer weather causes the disease to recede.Treatments are found that aid recovery.A vaccine is developed. The negative impact of the disease on the economy will be sharp but brief. The term 「V-shaped」 dominates most forecasts, both between Q2 and H2 and between 2020 and 2021. Thus, for example, one forecaster who has the earnings of the S&P 500 companies down 120% in Q2 thinks they may rise roughly 80 % in Q3 on a quarter-over-quarter basis (that is, to down just 20% from 2019) and then rise by a further 50% in Q4. And after a decline of 33% in 2020, earnings will rise by 55% in 2021 and exceed what they were in 2019. Telling people to stay home – and thus causing businesses to close – is the economic equivalent of putting a patient into a coma to facilitate curing a serious disease. The government will provide life support to the economy during the coma and bring the patient out of the coma after the cure has been effected. The economic recovery will be abetted by better news about the disease, but the improvement will mainly be the result of the success of the Fed/Treasury package of rescue and stimulus. These organizations have announced unprecedented expenditures and have indicated that they』ll do whatever else it takes. Actions that were taken after months of deliberation in the Global Financial Crisis have been rolled out in the early weeks of the current episode. Further steps are likely to include everything anyone can think of and be unconstrained as to amount. The banks are much less vulnerable than they were during the Global Financial Crisis, with only a third of the leverage.Thus concerns for the health of the overall financial system are greatly reduced. The U.S.’s effective private sector will supplement the public health efforts of government, producing massive amounts of supplies and equipment, and developing testing, treatments and vaccines. The price declines of securities will draw in buyers, and ample capital is available in the form of dry powder in funds. When I read the more positive views regarding the current episode, I can』t help but think back to my favorite newspaper headline, which included the phrase 「Bankers Optimistic.」 Usually the case, perhaps, but it’s worth noting that the story in question was published on October 30, 1929, reporting on the prior day’s stock market crash. On that day of optimism, the Great Depression still had eleven years to run. The Negative Case I always say we have to be aware of and open about our biases. I admit to mine: I』m more of a worrier than a dreamer. Maybe that’s what made me a better credit analyst than equity analyst. On average I may have been more defensive than was necessary (although somehow I was able to shift to aggressive action when crisis lows were reached during my career). Thus it shouldn』t come as a surprise today that my list of cons is longer than my pros (and I will elaborate on them at greater length). I』m very worried about the outlook for the disease, especially in the U.S. For a long time, the response consisted of suggestions or advice, not orders and rules. I was particularly troubled last weekend by pictures of college kids on the beach during spring break, from which they would return to their communities. The success of other countries in slowing the disease has been a function of widespread social distancing, testing and temperature-taking to identify those who are infected, and quarantining them from everyone else. The U.S. is behind in all these regards. Testing is rarely available, mass temperature-taking is non-existent, and people wonder whether large-scale quarantining is legal. The total number of cases in the U.S. has surpassed both China’s and Italy’s and is still rising rapidly (and is likely understated due to under-testing). The number of deaths doubled from 1,000 to 2,000 between Thursday and Saturday. From a recent tweet by Scott Gottlieb, MD, former commissioner of the FDA: 「I』m worried about emerging situations in New Orleans, Dallas, Atlanta, Miami, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, among others. In China no province outside Hubei ever had more than 1,500 cases. In U.S. 11 states already hit that total. Our epidemic is likely to be national in scope.」 The U.S. is under-equipped to respond in terms of hospitals, beds, ventilators and supplies. Under-protected doctors, nurses and first responders are at risk. I』m concerned that the number of cases and deaths will continue to rise as long as we fail to emulate the successful countries』 actions. The health system will be overwhelmed. Triage decisions – including who lives and who dies – will have to be made. There will be a point where there doesn』t seem to be an end in sight. I』m afraid the headlines are going to get much uglier in this regard. The economy will contract at a record rate. Many millions will be thrown out of work.People will be unable to patronize businesses. Not only will workers miss paychecks and businesses miss revenues, but businesses』 physical output will tail off, meaning essentials like food may run short. Last week, 3.3 million new unemployment claims were filed, versus the previous week’s 282,000 and the weekly record of 695,000. Prior to the government’s actions, expectations included the following: unemployment would return to 8-10%, and citizens would soon run short of cash; businesses would close; second-quarter GDP would decline from the year-ago level by 15-30% (versus a decline of 10% in the first quarter of 1958, the worst quarter in history); some forecasters said the combined earnings of the S&P 500 companies would decline 10% in the second quarter, but that seems like a ridiculously small decline. At the other end of the spectrum, I』ve seen a prediction that S&P earnings would decline by 120% (that’s right: in total, the 500 companies would shift from profits to losses). Government payments plus augmented unemployment insurance will replace paychecks for many workers, and aid to businesses will replace some of their lost revenues. But how long will it take to get these funds to recipients? How many should-be recipients will be missed? For how long will the aid continue? ($3,400 to a family of four won』t last long.) What will it take to bring the economy back to life after it’s been in a deep freeze? How fast will it recover? In other words, is a V-shaped recovery a realistic expectation? It will be very challenging to resolve the conflict between social isolation and economic recovery. How will we know whether the disease merits the cure? The longer people remain at home, the more difficult it will be to bring the economy back to life. But the sooner they return to work and other activities, the harder it will be to get the disease under control. First, the growth in the number of new cases each day has to be reduced. Next, the number of new cases has to begin to decline from one day to the next (that is, the growth rate has to turn negative). Then new cases have to stop appearing each day. (Of course, we』ll need increased testing and mandatory quarantining for these things to occur.) As long as there are new cases each day, there are people who are infectious. If we send them back into the world and into contact with others, the disease will persist and spread. And if we seize the opportunity provided by a decline in the number of new cases to resume economic activity, we risk a rebound in the rate of infection. For the most part, we have companies whose revenues are down and companies whose revenues are gone. They can reduce their expenses, but because many of them are fixed (like rent), they can』t reduce expenses as fast as revenues decline. That’s why second-quarter profits will shrink, dry up or turn negative. Revenues may come back relatively soon for some industries (like entertainment), but less rapidly for others (like cruise lines). Many companies went into this episode highly leveraged. Managements took advantage of the low interest rates and generous capital market to issue debt, and some did stock buybacks, reducing their share count and increasing their earnings per share (and perhaps their executive compensation). The result of either or both is to increase the ratio of debt to equity. The more debt a company has relative to its equity, the higher the return on equity will be in good times . . . but also the lower the return on equity (or the larger the losses) in bad times, and the less likely it is to survive tough times. Corporate leverage complicates the issue of lost revenues and profits. Thus we expect to see rising defaults in the months ahead. Likewise, in recent years, the generous capital market conditions and the search for return in a low-interest-rate world caused the formation of leveraged investment entities. As with leveraged companies, debt increased their expected returns but also their vulnerability. Thus I believe we』re likely to see defaults on the part of leveraged entities, based on price markdowns, ratings downgrades and perhaps defaults on their portfolio assets; increased 「haircuts」 on the part of lenders (i.e., reduced amounts loaned against a dollar of collateral); and margin calls, portfolio liquidations and forced selling. In the Global Financial Crisis, leveraged investment vehicles like Collateralized Mortgage Obligations and Collateralized Debt Obligations melted down, bringing losses to the banks that held their junior debt and equity. The systemic importance of the banks necessitated their bailouts (the resentment of which contributed greatly to today’s populism). This time, leveraged securitizations are less pervasive in the financial system, and their risk capital wasn』t supplied by banks (thanks to the Volcker Rule), but mostly by non-bank lenders and funds. Thus I feel government bailouts are unlikely to be made available to them. (As an aside, it’s not that the people who structured these leveraged entities erred. They merely failed to include an episode like the current one among the scenarios they modeled. How could they? If every business decision had to be made in contemplation of a pandemic, few deals would take place.) Finally, in addition to the disease and its economic repercussions, we have one more important element: oil. Due to a confluence of reduced consumption and a price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia, the price of oil has fallen from $61 per barrel at year-end to $19 today. The price of oil was only slightly lower immediately before the OPEC embargo in 1973, and in the 47 years since then it has only been lower on two brief occasions. While many consumers, companies and countries benefit from lower oil prices, there are serious repercussions for others: Big losses for oil-producing companies and countries. Job losses: the oil and gas industry directly provides more than 5% of American jobs (and more indirectly), and it contributed greatly to the decline of unemployment since the GFC. A significant decline in the industry’s capital investment, which recently has accounted for a meaningful share of the U.S.’s total. Production cuts, since consumption is down and crude/product storage capacity is running out. The damage to oil reservoirs that results when production is reduced or halted. A reduction in American oil independence. As recounted above, the negative case encompasses rising numbers of infections and deaths, unbearable strain on the healthcare system, job losses in the many millions, widespread business losses and mounting defaults. If these things arise, investors are likely to shift from the optimism of last week to the pessimism that was prevalent in the rest of March. Contributing factors may include: negative psychology surrounding the combination of threats to the economy and life itself,fear of more, anda very negative wealth effect that depresses spending and investing. The Government Programs Last week the government enacted the CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, with roughly $2 trillion of rescue and support. At the same time, the Fed will spend several trillion more to provide liquidity and buttress the financial system, and it has 「committed to using its full range of tools.」 I will dispense with listing all the provisions of the CARES Act, and merely note that J.P. Morgan’s description runs to eight pages. And as mentioned above, the list of ingredients and their magnitude are likely to grow. I』ll share a useful description of the economic situation and the government response from Conrad DeQuadros of Brean Capital, an economist I』ve taken to quoting: The CARES Act should not be thought of as fiscal stimulus but as an economic stabilization package. The collapse of economic activity in March 2020 is not a normal cyclical recession but is the result of a mandated 「time out」 of individuals and businesses by the government. Many of the provisions of the Act are designed to prevent the private sector from unraveling so that when the containment of the virus permits shutdowns to be lifted, activity can bounce back. . . . There is no avoiding recession because the output of airlines, hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, etc. is lost. However, these programs will support businesses so that when the virus permits the resumption of activity, we can see a sharp rebound in activity. Skilled labor was a scarce resource just one month ago and the key is to keep that labor and businesses connected. The support for businesses is really support for labor because if companies cannot pay workers from cash flows, the layoff figures will dwarf the numbers suggested by the latest jobless claims data. How effective will the measures be? In the latest quarter, labor compensation was $2.9 trillion (actual, non-annualized) and, to consider a purely illustrative number, a 20% (actual) drop in labor incomes amounts to $577 billion, which is about the magnitude of direct income support to households without considering the impact of support for businesses, which will head off a steeper decline in labor incomes. The fiscal package will unlock upward of $4 trillion of capital market support programs from the Fed. In addition there are the funds to help combat the spread of the virus and the sooner the virus can be contained, the more lives will be saved and the sooner America can get back to work. After a few months of being housebound, we suspect there will be plenty of pent up demand. The fiscal deficit in 2020 could be of the magnitude of $2.5 trillion but if the package fails, the recession would be longer and deeper and the fiscal cost would be greater. As always, I don』t know which economists are right, but I』m happy to go with Conrad’s summation. Moving on from understanding the actions to date, I want to talk about the outlook for this effort. The government seems able, as Conrad says, to support and stabilize the economy. In my simplistic view, I imagine it can print enough checks to replace every American worker’s lost wages and every business’s lost revenues. In other words, it can 「simulate」 the effect of the economy on incomes. But I have two questions: is that okay, and is it enough? First of all, as I mentioned above, we actually need the output of workers and businesses. If all businesses shut down, we won』t have the things we need. These days, for example, people are counting on grocery deliveries and take-out food. But does anyone wonder where food comes from and how it reaches us? The Treasury can make up for people’s lost wages, but people need the things wages buy. So replacing lost wages and revenues will not be enough for long: the economy has to produce goods and services. Second, let’s assume the government writes checks to replace wages and revenues forever, and that the economy continues to produce at a minimal but sufficient level, so the things we need materialize. What will be the long-term effect? As with oil reservoirs, what will be the impact of long-term inactivity on the ability of the economy to produce? How long will it take to restart the economy and bring it back to its previous level of functioning? Lastly, what would be the effect of the Treasury continuing to add trillions of dollars each quarter to the deficit (which was running at $1 trillion even before the virus hit) and of the Fed continuing to pump trillions more into the monetary system? Last June, in my memo This Time It’s Different, I discussed Modern Monetary Theory, which – to simplify – says federal deficits and debt don』t matter. It’s no longer just a theory; we have to deal with its implications now: What would be the effect of the above on the value of the dollar, and thus on the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency? (Of course, in this environment, other countries are likely to behave much the same as we do, meaning the dollar may not be debased relative to other currencies.) Might a reduction of the dollar’s reserve-currency status make it harder for us to finance our deficits and raise the interest rates we have to pay to do so? Might money-printing to that degree bring on an increase in inflation? Might a supply shock stemming from reduced global output of raw materials and finished goods add to the increase in inflation? The factors that create inflation are truly mysterious, but these certainly seem like reasonable candidates, especially when combined. Possibly without serious vetting and a conscious decision to adopt it, Modern Monetary Theory is here. Whether we like it or not, we』ll get to see its impact much quicker than I had thought. (And remember, 100% of the 「top scholars」 polled by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business disagreed with some of MMT’s claims). Summing Up Rather than reinvent the wheel – and to show you how others are viewing the situation (albeit in ways that parallel my view) – I』m going to share the workload by recycling the conclusion from a note I received from Jason Klein, CIO of Memorial Sloan Kettering: The bull case from here seems to be that monetary policy will work, fiscal policy will kick-in, valuations have reset, society will follow effective healthcare policies (e.g., social distancing) that will be effective, the real economy will adapt, and geopolitics will remain subdued. The bear market seems to be the flip side of each issue, and has the potential to be much darker as the prospects of a hot war with China, or even Iran, seem rather ominous. Across all recent events, I find it in some ways most interesting that Saudi Arabia chose to instigate a supply shock targeting U.S. shale at a moment when the demand for U.S. energy was already reeling from the demand-side shock from COVID-19 restrictions. It highlights the unpredictability of events. As you』ve said, nobody knows. Richard Masson, my Oaktree co-founder and resident scold, might say Twitter isn』t a worthy source, but nevertheless I want to include a concise summary tweeted by @yourMTLbroker: Bull case: everything opens in 6 weeks. The unemployed can go back to old jobs or as true Americans, bootstrap. Economy back to normal within 6 months. 2T $ in PE dry powder, low gas prices and 0% interest rates pour fuel onto on the economy. The roaring 20’s mean the 2020\\\'s now. Bear case: Unemployment goes to 20% . Everything does NOT go back to normal before at least a year or two, and in the meantime, there is a huge demand shock. The effects of the lockdown on businesses as well as the oil shock create depression-like conditions. In the Global Financial Crisis, I worried about a downward cascade of financial news, and about the implications for the economy of serial bankruptcies among financial institutions. But everyday life was unchanged from what it had been, and there was no obvious threat to life and limb. Today the range of negative outcomes seems much wider, as described above. Social isolation, disease and death, economic contraction, enormous reliance on government action, and uncertainty about the long-term effects are all with us, and the main questions surround how far they will go. Nevertheless, the market prices of assets have responded to the events and outlook (in a very micro sense, I feel last week’s bounce reflected too much optimism, but that’s me). I would say assets were priced fairly on Friday for the optimistic case but didn』t give enough scope for the possibility of worsening news. Thus my reaction to all the above is to expect asset prices to decline. You may or may not feel there’s still time to increase defensiveness ahead of potentially negative developments. But the most important thing is to be ready to respond to and take advantage of declines. The world will be back to normal someday, although today it seems unlikely to end up unchanged. What matters most – in terms of both health and finances – is how we do in the interim. Stay safe! March 31, 2020 （本文提及個股只做舉例分析，不做投資建議）

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